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Conference scene 1 Le tour des conferences 
Establishing the International Criminal Court 
NANCY AMOURY COMBS* 
The conclusion of the Rome Statute in July 1998 was a tremendous and unlikely 
achievement. After five weeks of grueling, often disheartening negotiations, the 
treaty establishing the first permanent international criminal court ("ICC") was 
adopted in an emotional vote of 120 to 7, with 21 countries abstaining. Spontane-
ous cheers, applause, and euphoria greeted the vote. Four short years later, the 
requisite sixty states had ratified the treaty, and the ICC opened its doors in July 
2002. 
With the applause now only an echo, the more mundane task of constructing-
piece by piece - the real-world institution that will bring perpetrators of interna-
tional crimes to justice is in full swing and was the subject of an intense, three-day 
conference, held 18-20 December 2002, atThe Hague, the location of the ICC. 
While scholars and academics exclaim over the ICC's revolutionary theoretical 
feacures, the Conference, entitled Establishing the International Criminal Court, 1 
focused more on the nuts and bolts of creating an efficient, viable international 
criminal justice institution in the midst of shrinking budgets, inconstant political 
support, and intense United States opposition. The Conference's advertised lise of 
speakers read like a Who's Who of international criminal law and human rights: 
Roger Clark, John Dugard, Philippe Kirsch, Roy Lee, William Pace, Michael Scharf, 
Otto Triffterer, Sergio Vieira de Mello, Sharon Williams, and Michail Wladimiroff, 
among others well-known in the field. A few of the "big names" were unable to 
appear, among the more notable, Claude Jorda, President of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY''), and Carla del Ponte, Prosecutor 
for the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), but 
the speakers who replaced them- Fausto Pocar, ICTY Judge, and Michael Johnson, 
ICTY Chief of Prosecutions, respectively- were up to the task. 
* Legal Adviser, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 
1 The Conference was presented by the International Criminal Law Network in coopera-
tion with the International Association of Prosecutors, the European Network of Forensic 
Science Institutes, and the International Criminal Defense Attorney Association. 
International Law FORUM du droit internationalS: 77-85, 2003. 
©2003 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands. 
78 Conference scene I Le tour des conferences 
The optimism and drama of Rome made occasional appearances. Philippe 
Kirsch, who chaired the Committee of the Whole at the Rome Conference, for 
instance, confidently asserted that in a few decades the ICC will be as natural to 
the international community as the United Nations now is. And Michael Johnson 
dramatically predicted that if the human race is going to survive, it will be as a 
result of the ICC enterprise.2 But on the whole, the presentations were rather 
cautious in both their appraisals and their forecasts, and they emphasized the chal-
lenges that threaten the new court. 
Perhaps the most well-known challenge comes from the United States, which 
has exhibited near pathological hostility to the ICC. It has threatened to obstruct 
the transfer of witnesses, documents, or any other type of information that would 
help with an ICC prosecution,3 and it has enacted laws that bar the use ofUnited 
States funds to assist the ICC and that authorize the United States President to use 
all means necessary and appropriate to free American soldiers arrested by the ICC.4 
Anticipating the Rome Statute's entry into force in July 2002 and failing to obtain 
ICC immunity for its peacekeeping nationals, the United States vetoed a U.N. 
Security Council resolution continuing the Bosnian peacekeeping mission5 and 
thereby pressured the Security Council into adopting Resolution 1422. The reso-
lution asks the ICC to refrain from investigating or prosecuting American or other 
non-party peacekeepers for at least one year and expresses the Security Council's 
intent to renew the request yearly for an indefinite period.6 In addition, the United 
States has pressured Rome Statute states parties to enter into agreements with the 
United States, pursuant to Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute, pledging that they 
will not transfer American peacekeepers to the court.? Many of the Conference 
2 Johnson went on to note that the 20th century had been history's most violent, and he 
maintained that if the human race continues on this path, it will no longer exist. Accord-
ingly, "the ICC, in its importance, has no equal." 
3 22 U.S.C. §§ 7423, 7425 (2002); Bruce Zagaris, US. Enacts Anti-ICC Law and Signs 
First Article 98 Agreement with Romania, 18 No. 7 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REPORTER 299 
(2002). 
4 22 u.s.c. §§ 7401, 7427 (2002). 
5 See Serge Schmemann, US. Vetoes Bosnia Mission, Then Allows 3-Day Reprieve, N.Y 
TIMES, July 1, 2002. 
6 S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002). 
7 Christopher Marquis, US. is Seeking Pledges to Shield its Peacekeepers from Tribunal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002; Zagaris, supra note 3. 
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speakers decried these heavy-handed American tactics, but no one suggested that 
such political solutions were not necessary, if distasteful, accommodations to a 
powerful and vocal foe. 
Indeed, the political necessity of these measures was underscored by the Con-
ference's Simulation Exercise on the last day of the Conference.8 The exercise, de-
veloped and directed by Professor Roy Lee of Columbia Law School, assigned 
Conference participants to one of four groups - prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
victims' representatives, or judges - and required them to present arguments on 
the applicability and legality of Security Council Resolution 1422 and an article 
98(2) agreement in a fictitious case involving thinly disguised United States 
peacekeepers transferred to the ICC to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. As a purely legal matter, the exercise was a compelling one. The partici-
pants assigned to be prosecutors made all the appropriate legal arguments: they 
challenged Resolution 1422 as ultra vires, arguing, in self-righteous tone, that arti-
cle 16 of the Rome Statute envisages occasional deferrals on a case-by-case basis, 
not a blanket and indefinite proscription on the prosecution of American peace-
keepers. They argued that the Security Council has no competence to modify a 
multi-lateral treaty. And they contended that countries that enter into article 98(2) 
agreements act inconsistently with their Rome Statute obligations. Despite the 
textual plausibility of the legal arguments, the exercise had an aura of fantasy about 
it, given the real world in which the ICC must operate: that is, there is greater 
likelihood that elephants will soon learn to fly than that an ICC Prosecutor will 
soon provoke an international confrontation by indicting American peacekeepers 
and challenging the Security Council's Chapter VII powers. Indeed, the only sce-
nario less likely is that the ICC judges would rule in favor of the prosecution in 
such a case. 
Political considerations thus pervaded the Conference presentations and high-
lighted the fact that, although courts are often idealistically considered above poli-
tics, every feature of the ICC's establishment and initial operation will be influenced, 
if nor controlled, by realpolitik. John Dugard, Professor ofPublic International 
Law at the University of Leiden, for instance, discussed the nominees for the 18 
ICC judgeships and lamented the fact that most states had nominated candidates 
who bear a close affiliation to the State,9 thus suggesting that states parties do not 
8 Conference attendees had the choice of participating in the Simulation Exercise or 
attending presentations relating to the forensics of international crimes. 
9 Dugard noted that some candidates are diplomats, and many have a history of support 
for governmental policies. 
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want the ICC to be roo very independent of their interests. Ono Triffterer, Profes-
sor of Austrian and International Criminal Law and Procedure at the University of 
Salzburg, and Sharon Williams, ad litem ICTY judge, both made extensive com-
ments on the gender and geographical balance required of the ICC bench. 10 The 
United States has complained about the selection criteria, maintaining that judi-
cial standards in many states are roo low11 and that judges from non-democratic, 
repressive, even terrorist, regimes could be elected tosit in judgment of American 
nationals.12 Both Williams and Triffterer, though apparently supportive of the ICC's 
gender and geographical requirements, acknowledged that they made for an 
exceptionally complex, nearly incomprehensible, judicial ballot. Whatever the 
complications they engender, Sureta Chana, ICTYTrial Attorney, reminded us of 
the values they advance when she admonished that the ICC's legitimacy will be 
severely undermined unless "it appears to represent the whole world." To maintain 
credibility and support, Chana asserted, the ICC must "avoid any danger of being 
accused of being a voice of the developed world, sitting in judgment on the devel-
oping world." 
Geographical and gender balance along with American threats are the sexy is-
sues that get most of the press, but the gravest challenge to the ICC, in my view, is 
the more mundane financial one: specifically, will the ICC be able to resolve a 
politically acceptable number of cases at a politically acceptable cost? The experi-
ence of the ICTY and ICTR is instructive, if worrisome. The ICTY has spent nine 
years and nearly $600 million 13 to dispose of seventeen cases, and the ICTR has 
spent seven years and nearly $500 million14 to dispose of nine cases. Even the 
Tribunals' most ardent supporters condemn the lengthy pre-trial detention many 
defendants suffer; at the Conference, ICTY Judge Fausto Pocar stated that defend-
10 Article 36(8)(a) of the Rome Statute requires states parties to consider when electing 
judges the need for "equitable geographical representation," "a fair representation of fe-
male and male judges," and "representation of the principle legal systems of the world." 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.l83/ 
9. 
11 See Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 389-90 (2002). 
12 Patricia McNerney, The International Criminal Court: Issues for Consideration by the 
UnitedStatesSmate, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181,186 (2001). 
13 ICTY Key Figures, avaihble at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm. 
14 See Mary Kimani, Carla Del Ponte Seeks Support from UK Parliamentarians to Investigate 
RPA Crimes, RWANDA INFORMATION, 9 Jan. 2003, available at http://www.rwanda.net/ 
english/News/news112002/news11292002b.htm. 
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ants not infrequently spend two years in pre-trial detention, a detention period 
that, he opined, "would be unacceptable in any country." 
Defenders of the Tribunals can point to a host of factors contributing to the 
high cost and long length of proceedings. Tribunal trials are held far from the 
locations of the crimes making it time-consuming and expensive for the parties to 
investigate the cases and locate witnesses and evidence. Many witnesses fear com-
ing forward, and others dispersed following the crimes making them difficult to 
find. 15 And evidence that might otherwise be easy to locate, is often concealed by 
governmental authorities, anxious to obscure the regime's wrongdoing. Indeed, 
the productivity of the ICTY, in particular, suffered for years because the states of 
the former Yugoslavia refused to transfer indictees or evidence, and the inter-
national community declined to press the issue. Once the evidence has been 
gathered, trials take considerable time as a result of the size and complexity of the 
cases. The elements of the crimes within the Tribunals', and the ICC's, jurisdiction 
- genocide, crimes against humanity, and various war crimes - are complex and 
time-consuming to prove. To prosecute a grave breach of the Geneva Conven-
tions, for instance, the prosecution must prove that the offense took place in the 
context of an international armed conflict.16 To prosecute a crime against human-
ity, the prosecution must prove that the act in question was "committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a [ ... ] civilian population."17 
Establishing these and other elements often requires days of witness and expert 
testimony and the introduction of dozens if not hundreds of exhibits. 
Good reasons thus exist for the high cost and long length ofTribunal proceed-
ings. Further, the Tribunals themselves have made great efforts to expedite pro-
ceedings. Judge Pocar noted that the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
have been amended 24 times now, with most of the amendments intended to 
accelerate proceedings. The Tribunals' rules now authorize judges to exercise greater 
authority over the pre-trial stage, among other things, to "ensure that the proceed-
15 See Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide 
and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 
January and 31 December 1994, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 53, U.N. Doc. N55/435-S/ 
2000/927 (2000) para. 78 (noting that in the Bagilishema case, 15 defense witnesses were 
called from twelve different countries). 
16 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, paras. 79-84. 
17 Rome Statute, supra note 10, at art. 7. 
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ings are nor unduly delayed."18 Tribunal judges conduct status conferences to moni-
tor rhe progress of trial preparation, and rhey set rhe number of witnesses rhar each 
side may call and determine the time available to both parries for presenting their 
evidence. 19 The Tribunals now make more efficient use of courtroom space, by 
conducting more than one trial in each courtroom. 20 They also berrer utilize judi-
cial resources, by, among other things, permitting certain proceedings to be held 
before one judge rather than a three-judge panel21 and other tasks robe performed 
by senior legal officers, rather than judges.22 These steps have improved matters, 
bur rhe statistics remain dismal, ar best. According to Judge Pocar, after rwo years 
of pre-trial detention, rhe average Tribunal defendant can look forward to a year-
long trial. And the international community can look forward to a $200 million 
bill for a year's worth of proceedings ar rhe ICTY and ICTR. 
That is a bill rhe international community appears no longer willing to pay. The 
U.N. Security Council, wirh the United Stares leading rhe charge, has larely pres-
18 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/REV.24, July 11-12, 2002, rule 65ter 
(B) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]. 
19 ICTY RPE, supra note 18, at rule 73bis(C), (E) and Rule 73ter{C), (E); see also ICTR 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 6 July 2002, Rule 73bis(C), (D) and Rule 73ter (C), 
(D), available at http://www.ictr.org [hereinafter ICTR RPE] . 
20 See Statement by the President of the ICTR tO the United Nations General Assembly, 
Oct. 28, 2002, available at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/speeches/pillay 
281002ga.htm [hereinafter President Pillay's Statement to the UN General Assembly]; 
Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecurion of Persons Responsible for Seri-
ous Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 57th Sess., Item 45 of the Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. 
A/57/150 (2002) at para. 60. 
21 For instance, the Tribunals amended Rule 62 of their RPE to provide that the initial 
appearance of the defendant could be conducted before a single judge rather than the full 
Trial Chamber. Compare ICTY RPE, Revision 16, as amended July 2, 1999, Rule 62, 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev16.htm#Rule 62, with ICTY RPE, 
Revision 17, as amended Nov. 17, 1999, Rule 62, available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
basic/rpe/IT32_rev17.htm#Rule 62. Certain motions have also been assigned to single 
judges rather than a full Chamber. Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citi-
zens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, para. 15, 57th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. N57/163-S/2002/733 (2002) [hereinafter ICTR 2002 Annual Report] . 
22 Compare ICTY RPE, Revision 19, as amended Dec. 1 & 13, 2000, available at http:// 
www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev19.htm#Rule 65ter, with ICTY RPE, Revision 21, 
as amended July 26, 2001. 
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sured the Tribunals to formulate a completion strategy; that is, to set a date for 
finishing their work and closing their doors.23 Disgruntled with the financial out-
lays required, the Security Council has pressured the Tribunals co finish sooner 
rather than later, and the Tribunals appear to be doing just that. The Tribunals' 
Prosecutor has drastically reduced the number of investigations she is going to 
conduct; in the ICTR, for instance, she has reduced the number of suspects to be 
investigated from 136 to 14.24 In similar vein, the Prosecutor has withdrawn the 
indictments of suspects considered not sufficiently high-level.25 Most importantly, 
the Tribunals have formulated plans to refer many of their cases co domestic courts. 
The ICTY intends to send to the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina about 50 of 
the approximately 100 defendants expected to be indicted by 2004, in addition to 
10 other defendants who are already in ICTY custody. The ICTY has proposed 
establishing within the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina a Chamber with 
special jurisdiction to try serious violations of international humanitarian law, and 
with a limited number of key posts reserved for international judges.26 Similarly, 
23 See The U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International justice or 
Show of justice?, Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, United States 
House of Representatives, (Feb. 28, 2002) (testimony of Pierre Prosper) ("We have and 
are urging both Tribunals to begin to aggressively focus on the end-game and conclude 
their work by 2007-2008 ... "). 
24 ICTR 2002 Annual Report, supra note 21, at para. 9. 
25 ICTY Press Release, Indictment Against Zoran Marinic Withdrawn, JLIP.I.S./695-e, 
Oct. 4, 2002 (noting that Marinic was "a low-level indictee" whose prosecution no longer 
corresponded to the Prosecutor's strategy). The Prosecutor actually began targeting high-
level offenders a few years ago, and recent pressure to complete the Tribunal's mandate has 
only accelerated that trend. See I CTY Bulletin, No. 21, July 27, 1998, at 4; see also Sean 
Murphy, Progress and jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, 93 AM.]. INT' L L. 57, 59, 74-75 (I 999). 
26 ICTY Press Release, Address by his Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Secu-
rity Council, JDH/P.I.S./690-e, July 26, 2002, available at hnp://www.un.org/icty/ 
pressreal/p690-e.htm. In establishing this special chamber, the ICTY would be seeking to 
ameliorate some of the "significant structural difficulties" that currently plague the courts 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These have been described as the 
!d. 
excessive compartmentalisation of the judicial systems of the Federation and the 
Republika Srpska, the lack of cooperation between the two entities, the political influ-
ence brought to bear on judges and prosecutors, the often 'mono-ethnic' composition 
of the local courts, the difficulty of protecting the victims and witnesses effectively, the 
court personnel's lack of training, and the backlog of cases at the courts. 
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the ICTR has identified 40 suspects whom the Prosecutor intends to refer to 
national courts; 25 are expected to end up in the courts of Rwanda, 27 which are 
already overwhelm~d by their efforts to try more than 130,000 genocide suspects. 
These events bode ominously for the ICC. The ad hoc Tribunals' problems with 
cost and efficiency are not unique to those bodies but rather are, to a greater or 
lesser degree, endemic ro international institutions prosecuting international crimes. 
Indeed, the ICC, with its worldwide geographical jurisdiction and indefinite pro-
spective temporal jurisdiction, is apt to face all the problems currently plaguing 
the ad hoc tribunals and more besides. Sam Muller, the ICC's Advance Team Coor-
dinator, warned that, while the international community might expect the ICC 
one day to be simultaneously prosecuting crimes resulting from three distinct situ-
ations, the international community is not likely to bestow on it $300 million per 
year and 3000 staff-members; that is, the ICTY's budget and staff times three. 
Muller made numerous recommendations; he stated that the ICC must have a 
sophisticated Case Document Management System, and it must have flexible pro-
cedures that, for instance, will allow the court to travel to the witnesses when it 
would cost too much for the witnesses to travel to the court. Michael Johnson 
echoed the former suggestion, 28 and in addition advocated brief, targeted indict-
ments. These recommendations are sound, but they are reminiscent of the im-
provements made to ICTY and ICTR procedures: helpful but not anywhere near 
enough. Recognizing these limitations, both men opined that the only sure way to 
limit the ICC's cost to that which will be politically palatable is ro limit, severely, 
the number of cases the court hears. Muller asserted, for instance, that the ICC 
will be able to hear no more than six cases per situation, with the remainder to be 
diverted to domestic courts. 
That sounds pragmatic, but what about those remaining cases? First off, to 
which domestic courts will they go? Complementarity forms a cornerstone of the 
Rome Stature and envisages the ICC prosecuting cases only when domestic courts 
are unable or unwilling to hear the cases themselves. Consequently, if the ICC is 
prosecuting its six cases, that presumably means that no able, willing states have 
stepped up to bat. It thus remains unclear which states will prosecute the other 
cases deemed sufficiently serious, unless one supposes that the ICC's interest in a 
situation will motivate other states not directly involved to commence prosecu-
27 President Pillay's Statement to the UN General Assembly, supra note 20. 
28 Michael Johnson noted that the ICTY has four-million pages of material and the ICTR 
one-million pages. As he put it: "When we are not able to know what we have and deliver 
it quickly, we become dysfunctional." 
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tions. Secondly, the ICC's limited capacity to hear cases will focus attention on the 
rather unseemly disparity between the ICC's state-of-the-art procedural protec-
tions and the less stringent due-process standards in place in many, particularly 
developing, countries. The ICC will presumably choose to prosecute those consid-
ered most responsible for the atrocities but by doing so will perversely bestow the 
greatest due-process protections- and probably the most lenient punishment- on 
the most culpable defendants, while relegating their less culpable subordinates to 
more arbitrary, harsher domestic courts. The problem is not new. Those most 
responsible for the Rwandan genocide are prosecuted in the ICTR, which pro-
vides them with extensive due-process protections and limits their punishment to 
terms of imprisonment. Less culpable Rwandans, by contrast, are subject to capital 
punishment and spend years in appalling, overcrowded Rwandan jails looking for-
ward only to a summary criminal trial lacking even the most basic procedural 
guarantees, like the right to legal representation. Although the problem is not new, 
it will gain more exposure with the ICC's involvement, and it brings into sharp 
relief a schizophrenic feature of the international community's current approach to 
criminal justice: the firmly held conviction that international criminal courts must 
adhere to the highest fair-trial standards coexists with the political reality that such 
standards cost far too much for everyday use. Thus, they are bestowed on only a 
few, and perhaps the least deserving, while the international community washes its 
hands of the rest, dispatching them to inadequate domestic courts in the name of 
complementarity, state sovereignty, or the like. 
The Conference speakers were, by and large, realistic and blunt about the ICC's 
prospects. The ICC has a long road to travel before it can be considered a credible, 
sustainable international body capable of dispensing respected international crimi-
nal justice. But at least the road exists. Fifteen years ago, the "idea of the establish-
ment of an international war crimes tribunal seemed noble yet unrealistic."29 The 
landscape has changed dramatically, ~most all for the good, but the ICC's ability 
to meet the challenges outlined above will determine in the next fifteen years, or 
less, whether the road leads to international accountability or is instead a dead end. 
29 Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International Criminal 
Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.). 440, 440 (1999). 
